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There is a common misconception that privacy and security are the same thing.  The reality 
is that while there is an intersection of these two topics, there are differences between security 
and privacy.  This paper illustrates similarities and differences between these topics. 
Background 
 
The purpose of this paper is to begin to develop understanding of the differences between 
privacy and security.  This differentiation is important because many practitioners and 
researchers discount the differences and assume that by providing a secure computing 
environment that privacy is also served.  We offer anecdotal evidence that this notion is untrue 
and develop new areas for privacy and security researchers to further explore the differences.  
The arguments presented here also raise empirical and contingent questions about the frequency, 
generalizability, and importance of the differences identified.  
 
Many analogies can be drawn from different areas of life experience.  For example, consider 
the idea of stuffing money under the mattress.  People who are often distrustful of banks or have 
income that they want to keep unrecorded will often stash cash at home.  This cash is private 
because banks and the IRS do not know about it.  Thus, hidden cash is a form of private wealth.  
But, is the money secure?  No; for money to be secure, it should be insured and stored in an 
institution that can offer some level of guaranty, such as a bank.  The same relationship holds 
true for many situations relating to Information Technology (IT) privacy and security. 
 
Consider the example of Internet email.  By default, Internet email is neither private nor 
secure.  Basic security and privacy can be added by simply employing passwords on computers 
and accounts.  Further privacy is added via encryption so that the message cannot be altered or 
read by unauthorized personnel.  At this point the message is private given that the encryption 
employed and the keys are sufficient and, because of passwords, there is some security.  
However, information transmitted via email may breach corporate security or leak customers' 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII).  Therefore, even with privacy, security can be 
breached.  To summarize this relationship, privacy does not offer security; there cannot be 
privacy without also having some security.   
 
The next sections of the paper define privacy and security constructs and characteristics that 
are the basis for this research.  Then, the commonalities between privacy and security are 
developed.  Next, intersections of privacy and security are discussed to develop understanding of 
the differences of the constructs.  From the intersection, directions for research to further develop 
our understanding of the differences between privacy and security are discussed. 
 
What is Privacy? 
Privacy has many facets and can be defined in many ways. Personal privacy generally applies 
to keeping confidential anything an individual does not want known, such as a person's location 
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(Solove, 2006).  For our purposes, privacy is "the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others” (Westin, 1967).  Westin’s definition is appropriate by its applicability 
to both individuals and institutions, and its focus on information.  Therefore, in this research, this 
definition describes information privacy.  
 
Characteristics of privacy include anonymity, fair use, and controlled access, life cycle, 
and use for integration (Culnan, 1995; Clarke, 1999; Gellman, 1998; Solove, 2004).  No 
empirical research validating these characteristics could be found, thus, each is debatable and a 
subject for further research. Each of these characteristics is defined in this section. 
 
Anonymity is defined as “of unknown authorship or agency” and “bearing no name” 
(Landau, 1992, p. 29) and usually applies to written materials.  In this research we adapt this 
definition to relate to personally identifiable information (PII) for customers, employees, clients, 
volunteers, etc. about whom information is collected by organizations.  While a whole suite of 
Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) has developed in the last ten years, most organizations do 
not use it.  Nor do organizations routinely encrypt data as a gross method of protecting records.  
Evidence of this problem is reported almost daily by Attrition.org’s breach list which shows a 
doubling of data leaks around the globe (Attrition.org, 2008).  Thus, anonymity is problematic in 
many organizations. 
 
Fair Use concepts stem from two sources – OECD Privacy Guidelines (1980, 1998) and 
U.S. Fair Information Practices (Culnan, 1995; U.S. Privacy Act of 1974).  In essence, the 
principles address limited data collection relevant to the context, limited data usage disclosed 
before use, protection against unauthorized access or use, no sharing, and all with that data 
subject’s consent. 
 
Access is defined as “right to approach, use, etc.” (Landau, 1992, p. 5).  “Privacy depends 
on degrees of accessibility of information...” (Solove, 2004, p. 213).  Access is partially covered 
under Fair Use concepts but those concepts assume no movement off organizational premises by 
authorized persons, and, therefore, do not go far enough to cover requirements for, e.g., 
encryption, or restricted location/device characteristics that today’s uses require.  Therefore, this 
extended view of access is developed as a separate concept. 
 
Use usually refers to using data for other than agreed upon uses by the collecting 
organization.  In this research, ‘use for integration’ refers to the industry practice of 3rd parties 
taking data from disparate sources for purposes of integration, profiling, and resale (Solove, 
2004).  This use of PII had not developed when the U.S. Fair Information Practice and EU Fair 
Use practices laws were developed.  Therefore, integration (as a negative characteristic of 
privacy) is developed as a separate concept. 
 
What is Security? 
Security is the condition of being protected against danger or loss Security typically is 
associated with characteristics of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA), all of which 
are controlled to implement computer security. A fourth characteristic, non-repudiation is 
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increasingly viewed as a requirement of secure computing.  Each of the characteristics is defined 
in this section. 
 
Confidentiality is defined as “assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized 
individuals, processes, or devices” (Krutz and Vines, 2004).  It is important to note that 
confidentiality is different than privacy.  Access is granted or denied based upon authorization 
and therefore information can be confidential but not private.     
 
Integrity is accuracy of the information and the IT controls in place to protect against 
unauthorized modification or destruction.  It is possible for information to be private but not have 
integrity because it can be modified or deleted (Merkow & Breithaupt, 2005).     
 
Availability is timely, reliable access to data and information services that are restricted for 
only authorized users (Krutz and Vines, 2004; Merkow & Breithaupt, 2005)  Among the CIA 
components, Availability is probably the most antithetical to privacy in that making information 
available makes it public that is,  not private.    
 
Finally, Non-Repudiation is the assurance that a sender of “data is provided with proof of 
delivery and the recipient is provided with proof of the sender’s identity, so neither can later 
deny having processed the data” (Krutz & Vines, 2004).  As we examine the differences between 
Privacy and Security, we will see that in all cases non-repudiation has a negative relationship to 
privacy characteristics. 
  
Commonalities between Privacy and Security 
There are areas of commonality that are also a source of some of the conceptual blurring of 
boundaries between privacy and security.  Some organizational commonalities might include 
corporate policy, governance, training, and technical implementation.   
 
The purpose of corporate policy for both privacy and security is to identify the position of 
management relative to the topic, delegate responsibility, identify the scope of policy affect, 
define compliance requirements, and define reprisals for lack of compliance.  Corporate policy 
drives actions and cultural response to privacy and security needs.  Privacy and security are 
treated as one in many companies and only with the huge number of data leaks and breaches are 
coming to be understood as different.   
 
In many companies, the corporate and technical groups responsible for security (which has 
had corporate awareness of need for over 20 years) are also responsible for privacy. Training of 
staff can cover both privacy and security in single session.  Corporate statements of privacy 
and/or security for which many companies require annual reading and signing, can also 
incorporate both concepts in one page.  In implementation, sometimes privacy and security are 
served by the same actions.  The many commonalities have contributed to the conceptual 
confusion between privacy and security.  Additionally, the technical implementation of security 
and privacy programs can use the same hardware, software, often are maintained by the same 
technicians.   
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Clearly, there are commonalities of privacy and security.  In large data breaches, both 
privacy and security can be lost.  The 2007 data breach at the U. S. Department of Transportation 
(DOT) is just one example of this common aspect of privacy and Security. In the DOT example, 
the daughter of a teleworker installed Limewire P2P Sharing software on her mother’s computer, 
inadvertently sharing DOT and National Archives files across the Internet (Broach, 2007).  
While this is a clear example of both security and privacy being lost, there are other examples 
where the intersections differ depending on the components of privacy and security examined. 
Intersections of Privacy and Security 
Evaluation of the intersection of privacy and security allows us to tease out implementation 
considerations in different situations.  There are many ways to look at the privacy-security 
intersection; this paper concentrates on the intersection of data and agent actions as they each 
relate to privacy and security characteristics.  Privacy considerations include anonymity, 
controlled life cycle, monitored use, fair use (CITE), controlled access, and the negative notion 
of data profiling and integration.   Security considerations include CIA – confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability as well as non-repudiation.   
 
The intersections of data and agents are evaluated through a series of tables looking at the 
privacy and security concepts in light of data privacy - agent security, agent privacy - data 
security, data privacy - data security, and agent privacy - agent security relationships.  Data are 
typically thought of as the focus of privacy and security.  Data refers to information used in an 
application and may relate to, for instance, manufacturing transactions, employees, application 
users, customers, and so on.  Some data are subject to privacy requirements more than other data.  
Regulatory laws may dictate privacy and/or security functional requirements.  HIPAA, for 
instance, is an example that requires patient data to be kept secure (security requirement) and 
have restricted access (privacy requirement), thus mixing the concepts of privacy and security in 
a single set of requirements (HIPAA, XXXX).   
 
Agents are the actors who might access, change, or copy data.  Agents include not only 
authorized application users, security staff, database staff, and computer operations staff, but also 
include unauthorized employees, hackers, or other who seek access but are not authorized. 
 
Each of the four figures presents a discrete view of privacy and security constructs in a 
different context of analysis.  The only construct that shows a consistent relationship across the 
four types of analysis is non-repudiation.  That is the data privacy - data security, data privacy - 
agent security, agent privacy - data security, and agent privacy - agent security privacy -- non-
repudiation relationships are consistent for all privacy constructs.   
 
Anonymity and integration/data profiling demonstrate a negative relationship with non-
repudiation.  Recall that non-repudiation is the ability to identify with certainty either an agent or 
some data.  It is reasonable that this certain identification is antithetical to anonymity.  Further, 
by integrating data in some way, non-repudiation becomes impossible, therefore it also 
demonstrates a negative relationship. 
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The privacy characteristics of controlled life cycle, monitored use, Fair Use, and controlled 
access all exhibit a positive relationship to non-repudiation.  This means that with controlled 
access, for instance, non-repudiation should also be possible, and vice versa.   
 
To demonstrate the reasoning that underlies the designation of each cell, anonymity and its 
relationships are traced through all four figures.  Anonymity is chosen because, like availability, 
it exhibits all relationships – supporting, negative, and neutral, depending on the data-agent 
relationships involved.   
 
Data privacy - data security and agent privacy - agent security anonymity and confidentiality 
support each other.  By support, we mean data (agent) anonymity supports or positively relates to 
data (agent) confidentiality.  Confidentiality relates to the maintenance of a secure environment 
against leakages while anonymity relates to the lack of individual record (or person) 
identification.  Thus, while similar, the concepts are different.  In the data privacy - data security 
and agent privacy - agent security dyads, the relationship is a supporting one such that by the 
presence of one condition, the other condition is facilitated. 
 
Data / Data Data Privacy 
 
Anonymity Controlled life cycle 
Monitored 






Confidentiality Support Support Support Support Support Negative 
Integrity Neutral Neutral Support Support Support Negative 











Repudiation Negative Support Support Support Support Negative 
 
Figure 1.  Data Privacy and Data Security Intersection 
 
 
Agent / Agent Agent Privacy 
 
Anonymity Controlled life cycle 
Monitored 






Confidentiality Support Support Negative Support Negative N/A 
Integrity Neutral Support Support Support Support Neutral 











Repudiation Negative Support Support Support Support Negative 
 
Figure 2.  Agent Privacy and Agent Security Intersection 
 
In the data privacy - agent security condition (Figure 3), data anonymity and agent 
confidentiality exhibit a neutral relationship.  By neutral, we mean that regardless of one state 
(e.g., data anonymity), no inferences about the state of the other characteristic (agent 
confidentiality) can be made.  For example, data on Wikipedia, whether valid or not, is 
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anonymous.  Since the data is anonymous, agent confidentiality can be maintained or not as 
desired. 
 
Conversely, in Figure 4, agent anonymity is counter or negatively related to data 
confidentiality because with agent anonymity one would expect breaches to increase.  Therefore, 
a condition of security would be no agent anonymity.   
 
Agent / Data  Data Privacy 
 
Anonymity Controlled life cycle 
Monitored 






Confidentiality Neutral Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral 
Integrity Context Support Support Support Support Negative 











Repudiation Negative Support Support Support Support Negative 
 
Figure 3.  Data Privacy and Agent Security Intersection 
 
Data / Agent  Agent Privacy 
 
Anonymity Controlled life cycle 
Monitored 






Confidentiality Negative Support Support Support Support N/A 
Integrity Negative Support Support Support Support Negative 











Repudiation Negative Neutral Support Support Support Negative 
 
Figure 4.  Agent Privacy and Data Security Intersection 
 
One cell in Figure 3, relating to data anonymity and agent integrity, can exhibit either a 
supporting or negative relationship depending on the context.  For instance, in a company 
setting, data anonymity is likely to exhibit a supporting relationship to agent integrity as an 
individual is unlikely to change data that is not known to them.  That is, a student might want to 
change a course grade but, with student anonymity, the transgressor won't know which grade to 
change.  In contrast, in a setting such as Wikipedia, data anonymity may negatively relate to 
agent integrity.  The agent is more likely to change data in a self-serving way because the data is 





This paper seeks to raise issues and heighten awareness of privacy and security as separate 
constructs, consisting of distinct characteristics.  We hope to raise debate and discussion on the 
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issues presented.  We do not feel completely comfortable that our assessments might not be 
changed through empirical research; in fact, we believe that each cell of each figure should 
become an area for further research consideration to tease out the nuances and variations of the 
relationships discussed. 
 
The concept of 'Target of Evaluation' (TOE) is one that focuses attention on different facets 
of a context, such as data privacy, agent privacy, contextual privacy, and so on.  These different 
facets have the potential to alter the outcome of the analysis by changing the privacy/security 
characteristic relationships.  Further, data is not a monolithic entity since the issues vary for data 
'at rest,' 'in transit,' and being accessed.  The 2008 Hannaford data breach in which hackers 
installed malware on internal servers to capture credit card data in transit (Messmer, 2008).  
Thus, even by following all Payment Card Industry (PCI) security regulations, privacy breaches 
are not protected against.  .  Thus, other targets of data evaluation are needed to present a 
complete view of data privacy/security issues.  Just because industry security guidelines are met 
does not mean that privacy concerns also are met.  A similar situation seems to exist for agent 
access.  Agent restrictions in applications can be either functional, data-related, or both.  These 
multiple ways of thinking of agent capabilities should also be subjected as targets of evaluation.   
Conclusion 
 
While security addresses some privacy characteristics, and privacy implies some security 
characteristics, the two constructs are distinct and should be treated separately.  Which is a 
greater concern -- to have security or privacy?  As this discussion attests, this is no simply 
question and the question has no simple solutions.  The intersections between privacy and 
security demonstrate that the trade-offs needed require consideration of many varied situations 
and that the situational context itself may change the relative relationships between the privacy 
and security characteristics.  As a result, developing only a secure view of a computing 
environment all but guarantees that privacy issues will be unsupported and, therefore, 
problematic. 
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